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KILL ALL THE LAWYERS?: SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL. By 
Daniel J. Kornstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994. 
Pp. xvii, 274. $24.95. 
On October 12, 1991, near the end of a long day of televised 
hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Alan Simpson 
read the following lines from Shakespeare to Supreme Court nomi-
nee Clarence Thomas: · 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls, 
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing; 
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands. 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed.1 
These lines, evoking the pain of impugned reputation, seemed 
to express Senator Simpson's sympathy for Thomas at a moment 
when Professor Anita Hill's accusations had put Thomas's reputa-
tion under exacting scrutiny. But, as Daniel Komstein2 points out 
in his new book, Kill All the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal, 
these words from Othello are spoken by the scheming Iago, who 
slyly emphasizes the importance of reputation to Othello just 
before falsely suggesting that the flirtations of Othello's wife Des-
demona have put Othello's own reputation in jeopardy (p. 157). 
Komstein suggests that a listener aware of this dramatic context 
might see Senator Simpson as an Iago, "placing each word carefully 
in the ear of Judge Thomas [not to soothe him but] to inflame his 
anger against [his] accuser" (pp. 156-57). 
Komstein's book explains the dramatic context surrounding 
many Shakespearean lines often quoted by lawyers. In so doing, 
Komstein organizes his book according to Shakespeare's "major 
legal themes" (p. xvi). Each chapter begins with a brief description 
of the characters and plot of a particular Shakespeare play; Kom-
stein then explains the themes in that play one by one. As he 
presents them, these themes are often independent and unrelated. 
For example, Chapter Three on Measure for Measure includes sec-
tions on subjects ranging from "Law and Morality" and "Privacy" 
to "Dead-Letter Statutes" and "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" 
(pp. 35-64). The autoJ,lomy of these sections lends the book an en-
cyclopedic feel. Kornstein himself acknowledges in the Prologue 
1. P. 157 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Onrauo act 3, sc. 3, 11. 160-66 (Stanley Wells 
& Gary Taylor eds., Oarendon Press 1988)). 
2. President, Law and Humanities Institute; Founding partner, Komstein Veisz & Wexler. 
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that his book seems· like the beginning to an "encyclopedia on the 
subject of Shakespeare and the law" (p. xvii). 
So what is this subject of Shakespeare and the law? Kornstein 
does not explicitly describe this broad and ambitious project. He 
admits that his book might be criticized for not elaborating "enough 
about Shakespeare's life, or the law, or each play, or the theories of 
how we can make the connections," and he preempts that criticism, 
saying, "To that charge I plead no contest" (p. xvii). After apolo-
gizing for not focusing on these issues in his book, he never quite 
explains what issues he will emphasize. Early on, he suggests a few 
possible foci, dwelling in turn on the law and literature movement, 
Shakespeare's life, and his own relationship to Shakespeare's work. 
None of these introductory discussions, however, accurately deline-
ates the actual approach Kornstein takes in describing the major 
legal themes of Shakespeare's plays. 
Kornstein first presents his book as a law and literature project. 
In Chapter One, he positions himself as a proponent of the law and 
literature movement, which promotes the use of law and literature 
to inform each other (pp. 3-11 ). He claims that law often serves up 
"the stuff of literature" and that literature clarifies our understand-
ing of the law and "move[s] more hearts and minds" than the law 
(pp. 4, 8). In describing this reciprocal relationship, Kornstein does 
not explain how it relates to his. project. He insists that the connec-
tion between law and literature is "a field itself worthy of study," 
but he does not define the limits of that field (p. 9). Kornstein ap-
parently appeals to the law and literature movement to justify his 
topic and not to borrow any specific critical approach. 
Second, Kornstein attempts to explain how Shakespeare knew 
so much about law (pp. 11-21). This biographical digression also 
fails to explain his focus. In fact, Kornstein expressly disavows the 
notion that his project is "to speculate on the biography of ~e 
Bard" (p. xvi). Nevertheless, relying on evidence from W. Nicholas 
Knight's book Shakespeare's Hidden Life,3 he argues that certain 
social and personal circumstances may have led Shakespeare to de-
velop a particular interest in. the law. For example, Kornstein first 
suggests that Shakespeare and the other playwrights of his time 
may have developed legal themes in order to appeal to the law stu-
dents from the Inns of Court in London who made up much of their 
audience (p. 13). In support of this proposition, he points out that 
during Shakespeare's career, more than a third of the plays per-
formed in London had at least one trial scene (p. 13). In addition, 
Kornstein argues that personal involvement with the courts may 
have sharpened Shakespeare's interest in law (pp. 15-21). He de-
3. Pp. 15-20 (relying on W. NICHOLAS KNioHr, SHAKESPEARE'S HIDDEN LIFE: SHAKE-
SPEARE AT nm LAW, 1585-1595 (1973)). 
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scribes Shakespeare as "obsessed" with an ill-fated legal dispute 
over his inheritance, which, in conjunction with other cases, made 
him into a "walking litigation factory" (pp. 16, 19). At the end of 
the book, however, he casts doubt upon the theory that Shake-
speare worked as a lawyer or law clerk during the ten years of his 
life about which we know nothing (pp. 228-38). In sum, the bio-
graphical discussions intimate few parallels between Shakespeare's 
experiences and his plays,4 and Kornstein's subsequent discussions 
of the plays rarely allude to Shakespeare's life. 
Kornstein's own life presents another possible focus for his dis-
cussion. More than once Kornstein describes how he personally re-
sponded to a Shakespearean performance,5 and he explains that 
"each of us approaches Shakespeare idiosyncratically" (p. xvii). 
Kornstein's idiosyncratic responses pervade his discussion. The 
plays stir his memory, and his recollections - legal and nonlegal -
pepper the text. For him, the line "Let's kill all the lawyers"6 con-
jures up a slew of lawyer-haters - Ambrose Bierce, debt-ridden 
farmers in Shay's rebellion in 1786, and President Bush's press sec-
retary Marlin Fitzwater, for example (pp. 23-24, 27, 33). These 
legal, cultural, and historical references reveal Kornstein's political 
leanings and legal activism. For example, he says that "Oliver 
North ... should read Richard II" and that in A Midsummer Night's 
Dream, "Shakespeare is encouraging a 'living document' approach 
to interpreting the Constitution" (pp. 198, 131). Kornstein uses 
such references only to illustrate and decorate his points and not to 
make them. Kornstein's own life, like Shakespeare's life and the 
theories of law and literature, remains peripheral to the focus of his 
discussion of Shakespeare and the law. 
Kornstein's commentary on the plays eventually reveals three 
basic critical approaches to his subject of Shakespeare and the law. 
First, Kornstein presents many political, interpretive, and ethical 
themes as essentially legal in nature. Second, he compares Shakes-
pearean characters and situations to legal characters and situations. 
Third, he applies modern concepts of law to dramatic characters 
and situations. These approaches,, employed independently, 
achieve varying levels of success. 
First, Kornstein examines the plays to identify those themes, is-
sues, and ideas that are legal in some way. After locating a legal 
element in a play, he discusses the parallel modern legal concept. 
4. Komstein suggests that Shakespeare's lawsuit over his inheritance might explain his 
interest in inheritance in King Lear, and that Shakespeare's appeal to equity in the lawsuit 
foreshadows the courtroom battle over the contract in The Merchant of Venice (p. 17). 
5. See, e.g., pp. xi, 157. 
6. P. 22 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KINo HENRY nm 
Socra act 4, sc. 2, I. 78 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Clarendon Press 1988)). 
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For example, Komstein suggests that in Measure for Measure, An-
gelo's abrupt decision to a!fest Claudio for violating a previously 
unenforced prohibition on fornication is unfair as a: matter of law 
(pp. 36, 46). He then describes how modem law addresses this un-
fairness under the legal doctrine of desuetude (pp. 47-49). 
Komstein takes an expansive approach to the identification of 
"legal themes." In Julius Caesar, Komstein sees legal issues in 
Brutus's Machiavellian determination that the violent means of as-
sassinating Caesar are justified by the expedient end of advancing 
the classic republican political system (pp. 113-14). Legal themes 
also appear to him in A Midsummer Night's· Dream in Theseus's 
comment to Hippolyta that plays are not silly "if imagination 
amend them";7 to Komstein, this remark suggests activist theories 
of interpretation applicable to the Constitution (pp. 129-31). In 
The Winter's Tale, Paulina's outspoken criticism of Leontes, who 
has unjustly accused his wife Hermione of adultery, reveals Paulina 
to be "the citizen-critic of government" and thus adds a legal di-
mension to the play (p. 190). Komstein sees any theme involving 
politics, interpretation, or ethical qualities as legal. 
The more Komstein perceives dramatic elements as "legal," the 
less insightful his discussion tends to be. In discussing Richard II, 
Komstein describes the power vacuum created by Richard's weak-
ness as involving "the very stuff of constitutional law" and "the na-
ture of government itself" (p. 199). Having made this vague 
connection to law, he does not seem to know what to do next. He 
simply concludes that Richard II "provides some of the intellectual 
background of the American Revolution" (p. 200). That offhand 
observation leaves the reader with no clearer understanding of 
Shakespeare or of the law. 
Second, Komstein analyzes Shakespeare's characters and dra-
matic scenes as legal characters and dilemmas. This approach en-
ables him to cast light on dramatic characters and situations by 
evaluating them from a legal perspective. In the discussion of The 
Merchant of Venice, for example, Komstein illuminates the charac-
ter Portia by evaluating her performance in her roles of judge and 
lawyer (pp. 68-76). He argues that Portia's reliance on a legal tech-
nicality to thwart the character Shylock impugns not only her sub-
stantive fairness as a judge but also her overall fairness as a person 
(pp. 76-77). The comparison of dramatic situations with modem 
legal situations makes those dramatic situations more immediate 
and imaginable for modem lawyers. By describing the peace nego-
tiations in Henry IV Part 2 as akin to a settlement conference, 
Komstein prevents the reader from viewing the archbishop of 
7. P. 129 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER Nxmn"s DREAM act 5, sc. 1, I. 
211 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Clarendon Press 1988)). 
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York's admonition, "A peace is in the nature of a conquest, I For 
then both parties nobly are subdued, I And neither party loser"B as 
merely a military maxim from a remote era (pp. 140-41). In this 
way, his comparisons of dramatic contexts with more familiar legal 
situations imaginatively enlist his legal perspective. 
All is not well with this legal perspective, however. Komstein 
often fails to situate his legal perspective within a broader analysis. 
For example, he sometimes evaluates characters as if they were ac-
tually and only modem legal personae, without realizing that this 
approach is reductive. His comparisons of dramatic situations to 
modem legal conflicts often warp crucial aspects of the plays. For 
example, when he criticizes Portia in The Merchant of Venice for 
relying on a technicality instead of simply finding Shylock's contract 
void as against public policy, he not only assumes that the public 
policy safeguard obtained in medieval Venice, but he also assumes 
away the premise that Antonio cannot escape enforcement of the 
contract (p. 71). Such anachronistic relations of modem law to 
Shakespeare's dramatic situations distort Komstein's critical 
understanding. 
Komstein unfortunately allows this modem legal perspective to 
guide his critical project. His goal is to uncover Shakespeare's legal 
messages for modem lawyers. Thus, he repeatedly seeks to reduce 
the plays' complex themes to simple lessons for lawyers. This 
message-driven focus is apparent in his discussion of Dick the 
Butcher's line: "The first thing we do, I Let's kill all the lawyers" in 
Henry VI Part 2.9 Komstein envisions his purpose in this second 
type of analysis as divining Shakespeare's message; for instance, he 
concludes fuat the "original intent behind Dick's line" remains un-
clear because "[i]n such equivocal circumstances, and without more 
definitive biographical facts, it is impossible to say for sure what 
Shakespeare himself thought about lawyers or what he personally 
intended by Dick the Butcher's line" (p. 33). Komstein imputes to 
Shakespeare a legal wisdom and moral authority that causes him to 
perceive Shakespeare's plays as a fertile source of legal and moral 
lessons for the lawyer. For example, Henry IV Part 2 becomes "a 
8. Pp. 140-41 (quoting Will.IAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KINo HENRY nm 
SIXTH act 4, sc. 1, II. 315-17 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Clarendon Press 1988)). 
9. P. 22 (quoting SHAKESPEARE, supra note 6, at act 4, sc. 2, I. 78). Komstein argues that 
the line has three "layers of meaning," with each layer representing a particular view of 
lawyers. P. 25. First, the line, yelled by Dick the Butcher amid a crowd of commoner rebels 
about to invade London in a popular revolt, might be understood as a criticism of lawyers as 
defenders of the status quo. Pp. 26-28. Second, because the disruptive role of the rebels 
appears in stark contrast to the stabilizing role of lawyers, the line might act as a backhanded 
compliment to the legal profession. Pp. 28-32. Finally, in what Komstein declares to be "the 
most penetrating, and yet previously unexplored layer of meaning," the rebels' protest of the 
legal maneuvers by which the good Duke of Gloucester was tricked might amount to a criti-
cism not of "all law, but perverted, false law." Pp. 32, 33. 
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morality play about youth faced with a choice between law and van-
ity" (p. 139). 
The lessons Komstein elicits often seem banal. For example, he 
explains "[t]he lesson of Hamlet" with an allusion to Justice 
Holmes, because "Holmes saw that such passion needs to be chan-
neled" (p. 96). This approach oversimplifies the plays and ignores 
their complexity. When Komstein claims that "[t]he whole theme 
of Othello can be summed up in terms of reputation," he dramati-
cally underrepresents Shakespeare's appeal (p. 162). 
Komstein's penchant for reducing each play to a lesson mirrors 
the manner in which lawyers reduce complex legal issues to single 
questions for courts to decide. Although he concedes that "[w]hen 
it comes to Shakespeare I am only an amateur," his critical ap-
proach seems not amateurish but lawyerly (pp. xiii-xiv). Some of 
his lawyerly talents prove handy: he clearly parses out the facts of 
each play and ably notices legal issues. Like an advocate, at many 
points throughout the book he takes and argues one side of an is-
sue. This trial-lawyer approach to the plays again makes too little 
of their dramatic complexity. For example, in his analysis of The 
Merchant of Venice, Komstein defines his project as deciding 
whether Shylock is a "monster" or a tragic victim - which he dubs 
respectively the "majority" and "minority" views - and in doing so 
neglects the possibility that Shylock is both (p. 66). This intolerance 
of nuance and paradox appears again when, frustrated by his inabil-
ity to reduce Portia to a caricature, he exclaims, "Some feminist! 
Portia almost seems like two different persons: one the clever, 
forceful judge, the other a passive princess" (p. 82). 
As an advocate, Komstein needs characters to champion. Ac-
cordingly, after observing that Shylock's daughter Jessica, who ran 
away from her father and married out of her faith, "talks less but 
rebels more" than Portia, he hurriedly concludes that she "may 
claim equal or better title as feminist heroine of the play" (p. 82). 
Komstein's partisanship also leads him to hyperbolic description. 
Portia's condemnation of Shylock makes her "not just a minor-
league bigot, but a world-class, equal opportunity hate monger" (p. 
76). Contrast Komstein's description of Bottom the Weaver in A 
Midsummer Night's Dream - who by Puck's magic temporarily 
turns into an ass and then later imagines ·it all a dream - as not 
only more self-aware, but in fact "the Jeffersonian ideal, the great 
liberal hope" (p. 133). Such extreme characterizations suggest 
Komstein's effectiveness as an advocate but call into question his 
credibility as a literary critic. Komstein's legal approach ends up 
distorting Shakespeare. 
Komstein's project - understanding Shakespeare's meaning -
remains crucial for lawyers, as well as Senators, who seek to "use" 
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Shakespeare. Lawyers do use Shakespeare - his plays are quoted 
in judicial opinions far more often than are any other works of liter-
ature (p. 241). But why? Kornstein views Shakespeare as a legal 
and moral teacher; this, however, does not fully indicate why truths 
seem more true coming from Shakespeare. Rather, the authority 
behind such quotations lies not in the wisdom of the Bard but in the 
erudition of the quoter. Furthermore, when Kornstein argues that a 
remark of the chief justice to Falstaff in Henry IV Part 2 "com-
presses in a verse a whole primer on advocacy," he brings to light a 
more sensible use of quotation: as a source of "compressed" elo-
quence (p. 141). Lawyers can draw upon and learn from Shake-
speare's language, in all its eloquence and concision, in their 
professional pursuits. 
Lawyers can use Shakespeare for more than quotation. Shake-
speare's situations and characters strike us as real. They vividly il-
luminate human experience and human nature.10 While 
Kornstein's readings of the plays as lessons seem to confirm Judge 
Richard Posner's warning that law in literature is no more than a 
metaphor,11 literature's role in law need not be confined to legal 
themes in order to be useful to lawyers. Whenever a lawyer needs 
to appeal to actual human experience and human nature, literature 
may assist him in that appeal. Kornstein's difficulty in evading the 
dangers of a legal approach in his critical endeavor suggests only 
that an encyclopedia of legal themes is work for Shakespearean 
critics, not lawyers. 
So what useful books can energetic lawyers fond of Shakespeare 
write? Kornstein's third approach to connecting Shakespeare and 
the law provides a clue. Under this approach, he engages not in 
describing the legal meaning of the plays but in applying modern 
law to the characters and situations in those plays. His assumption 
that modern American legal doctrines obtain in the context of the 
plays proves both dangerous and valuable. While any attempt to 
use such doctrines to understand the dramatic characters and situa-
tions is anachronistic and misleading, the application of modern law 
to the Shakespearean situations can show how modern American 
law might resolve those situations today. For example, when Korn-
stein describes how an imaginary appeal of Shylock's conviction 
might turn on doctrines such as due process and equal protection, 
10. Komstein laments, "Classic authors do not seem to matter to modem young people." 
P. 12. But because Komstein also observes that 
in our teens or barely out of them, we are usually too young to understand fully or 
appreciate the plays. We have not lived enough, we are too inexperienced. We bring 
too little to the encounter. We can perhaps memorize a few lines and parrot the narra-
tive, but not much beyond that, and certainly not with real understanding [p. xv] 
it is hard to see why they should. 
11. P. 6 (discussing RICHARD PosNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MlsUNDERSTOOD RE-
LATION (1988)). 
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he illustrates how differently our modem legal system affords rec-
ognition to issues of mercy, fairness, and equality (pp. 83-85). 
Beyond this application of modem law to these dramatic situa-
tions, there is more that lawyers can do. Shakespeare's dramas pro-
vide paradigms of conflict, and Komstein observes at the end of his 
book that "[w]e often measure, analyze, and consider legal issues 
against a Shakespearean pattern" (p. 245). Komstein could per-
form such an analysis, but he often stops short. For example, in his 
discussion of King Lear he mentions that a recent book by Jane 
Smiley, A Thousand Acres, 12 reimagines Lear's situation .today as 
an inheritance dispute. Komstein tells us that Smiley's characters 
Larry and Caroline . (Lear and Cordelia)' lose their case and face 
sanctions for suing in the first place (pp. 225-26). Komstein con-
cludes merely that this outcome "may symbolize the law's limits" 
(p. 225). He thus answers the question, "How would Lear be re-
solved today?" without proceeding to other questions that he has 
the legal expertise to answer: "Am I happy with that modem re-
sult? If not, does that suggest a problem in modem law?" These 
are questions we hope those like Komstein - with the mind of a 
lawyer and a love of Shakespeare - will address. 
- Kevin T. Traskos 
12. P. 225 (discussing JANE SMILEY, A THOUSAND ACRES {1992)). 
